2013: Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative
2007: China Ex‑Im Bank provided a commercial loan to finance Hambantota Phase I
2010: New port opened in limited form
Timeline: China a De-globalizing World
2001: China joins WTO
2008: Global Financial Crisis
2012: Xi Jinping becomes leader
2013: Belt and Road Initiative announced
2016: Brexit; Trump 1.0; Trade war with China
2019: Covid-19
2025: Trump 2.0; USAid canceled
Key Questions
Port of Hambantota: Was it a good investment? For whom? At what cost?
Belt and Road Initiative: What is it? How is it introduced and implemented?
How did China become a global lender and investor? Specifically, how Does party-state capitalism in China interact with international development and global capitalism?
China and Sri Lanka: History
What is the history between China and Sri Lanka before BRI?
What about China’s relationship with the rest of South Asia?
How does history shape the BRI relationship?
China and Sri Lanka: A Shared History
1815-1948: British Ceylon (colony)
1948-1972: Independence, from dominion to republic
1955: Asian–African Conference (Bandung Conference) and beginning of Non-Aligned Movement
1983-2009: Sri Lanka Civil War, between gov forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
1952: Rubber-Rice Pact (exchange Chinese rice for Sri Lankan rubber)
1963: Maritime trade agreement, China’s first trade agreement with a non-communist country
1983: Support to Sri Lanka governments against separatist Tamil Tigers
2012: China became Sri Lanka’s biggest provider of development assistance
2016: China became Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner
China, Sri Lanka, India: A Complex Triangle
China and Sri Lanka’s 1963 trade agreement targeted a shared neighbor: India.
Mao and Nagalingam Shanmugathasan (1920-1993), General Secretary of the Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist)
1959: Dalai Lama flees China amid the Great Leap Forward.
1962: China and India clash at the Kongka Pass, which lies along the Line of Actual Control. The four-week conflict left thousands dead on the Indian side before China’s forces withdrew.
1963: China’s maritime trade agreement with Sri Lanka, its first with a non-communist country.
1970s: Political parties in South India backed Tamil separatism within Sri Lanka
Sino-Indian Relationship: Between Cooperation and Competition
Relationship between China and India – between the two nuclear powers and major economic players – remains strained by ongoing tensions along their shared border and a competitive security posture.
The two countries are vying for leadership of the Global South, with both countries using infrastructure investments and diplomacy to lure in partners, including Sri Lanka.
Sino-Indian Competition: From the Himalayas …
New roads are being built, runways extended, and rivers altered.
Key infrastructures: Chengdu-Lhasa railway, China-Nepal railway, Medog Hydropower Station on Yarlung Tsangpo River (1 trillion RMB, world’s largest)
Remote Himalayan regions are reconfigured for better movement and accessibility.
Both India and China are building dual-use infrastructure with strategic functions for territorial claims.
Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM): proposed road, rail, water and air link connecting India and China through Myanmar and Bangladesh as a corridor.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Sino-Indian Competition: … to Sri Lanka
How strategic is Sri Lanka’s location?
What are SL’s main ports?
Why invest in ports? What makes them good/bad investments?
Sri Lanka: Pearl of the Pearls
Containerization: A Global History
Before 1950s: break-bulk items required “stevedoring” – manual loading, lashing, unlashing and unloading from the ship one piece at a time.
The earliest container ships were converted tankers in the 1940s after World War II. Today, about 90% of non-bulk cargo worldwide is transported by container by about 50,000 container ships.
China’s Weak Sea Link
China is a major manufacturing nation, with over 80% of imports and exports rely on sea transport.
The First Island Chain – a line of islands stretching from the Kuril Islands in the north through Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines to Borneo in the south – handles 30% of global oil transport, over 40% of global container ships and over 30% of bulk cargo (like iron ore, coal, grain).
Key bottleneck: 80% of East Asia’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca.
The region’s safety and stability are vital for China – and the entire world.
South China Sea
Major Shipping Routes: Chokepoints
India and China: Shared Insecurities
The Indian Ocean is especially critical for India and China, which receive nearly half of the oil products transiting through chokepoints there.
India
India relies on the ocean for 95% of its international trade and 80% of its energy.
40% of the world’s offshore petroleum is found in the Indian Ocean.
Four of the world’s six most important maritime chokepoints are in the Indian Ocean.
China
Food and energy reliant on foreign imports.
The first island chain – a lifeline for import and export – controlled by the US and its allies.
China in the Indian Ocean
2017: China establishes its first overseas military base in Djibouti, on the coast of the Horn of Africa.
2025: China funds a “joint logistics and training center” at Cambodia’s main naval base, Ream Naval Base.
New flashpoints: Mauritius, Coast of Africa, and beyond
BRI and US Naval Bases: Too Close For Comfort?
While China now has more ships in its navy than the US, it has only two overseas military base. The United States has around 750 - one also in Djibouti.
Hambantota Port: Considering the Project
What is the Hambantota Port project?
What did the feasibility studies say?
What are the two phases?
What makes a port a commercially viable project?
Hambantota Port: Hastened by Electoral Campaign
Mahinda Rajapaksa (b. 1945): sixth President of Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015; the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka from 2004 to 2005, 2018, and 2019 to 2022.
Phase I built infrastructure for bulk shipping, not containerized cargo.
Original plans aimed for Phase I profit before Phase II.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa accelerated Phase II, possibly for political gain during the presidential campaign, and potentially harming the country.
Role Play: Investing in Hambantota
Three roles:
China Export-Import Bank
China Harbor Group
Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA)
Mahinda Rajapaska (Sixth President of Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2015)
Questions
Was developing a port at Hambantota a good idea?
Would you invest in this project? Why or why not?
Hambantota: The Pros
China
China Export-Import bank does the financing, China Harbor Group (an SOE) does the construction, Sri Lanka pays.
Secure way to transport oil from the Middle East and North Africa and refuel if access to the Malacca Strait is threatened
Feasibility studies cannot account for growth projections in East Africa, India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, etc.
Port of Colombo reaching capacity, even when it expands, hits capacity
Sri Lanka
Gets a guarantee for southern development.
Sped up phase II of container port because Rajapaksa knew he would / could lose and no one would do it
Hambantota: The Cons
China
Don’t trust Rajapaksa: The project was motivated by
Sri Lanka’s civil war, still in its bloody final phase in 2007.
Don’t believe that SL can come through with the ancillary investments that make a port viable
Sri Lanka:
International financial institutions, US, and India said no; discredited SLPA and Sri Lanka in general
Feasibility studies were pretty negative – or at least the port would aid world development in a direction that wouldn’t benefit the west.
No development in Southern region to warrant container port; Can’t compete with Singapore
The Renegotiation: Timeline
2010–2012:
Under Rajapaksa the project was scaled up (ambitious Phase II container plans) despite early feasibility studies that flagged weak commercial viability;
Phase II financing and SOT (Supply‑Operate‑Transfer) proposals with China Harbor/China Merchants followed
2012–2016:
Hambantota initially had low commercial traffic and required cross‑subsidy from Colombo; by mid‑2016 macro pressures made Sri Lanka seek dollar financing and private investment in the port
2015: Maithripala Sirisena defeated Rajapaksa in presidential election; new parliament amended the constitution to restore the presidential two‑term limit
2016: A balance‑of‑payments/financing squeeze emerged; Sri Lanka arranged IMF support
2017:
A long‑term concession/PPP was concluded with China Merchants (joint ventures HIPG/HIPS with 99‑year operating rights
Buyback options for SLPA and explicit prohibition on military use without Sri Lankan approval) to address financing gaps and refinance debt
Discuss: 99-year lease of Hambantota
Who got the better deal from the renegotiation?
What are the benefits? What are the costs? And for whom?
Is this “debt trap diplomacy”? Did the new Sri Lanka government have a choice?
The Deal: Financial Details
The media often calls the port lease purchase a “debt-for-equity swap”. How accurate is this?
China loaned Sri Lanka $757 million for a port at 2% interest in 2012.
This rate was lower than the 6.3% rate for the port’s Phase I in 2007.
Both loan rates were considered good deals for Sri Lanka compared to the LIBOR rates on the international markets.
China’s equity investment went to the Sri Lankan government, which used it to pay off other debts.
Who Trapped Who, Really?
Democratic elections as leverage: The new president Maithripala Sirisena ran on a platform against Chinese investment and debt.
He suspended the Port City project to renegotiate the deal.
Sri Lanka was under fiscal pressure from its bond obligations to Western lenders.
The renegotiated deal allowed China to invest equity in the port at its original price.
China needs the Hambantota port project to prove BRI a success.
In the meantime: Colombo Port City
What is it?
How to pay for it?
Can it work?
What does it have to do with the development of the Hambantota Port?
Colombo Port City: History
China Harbor was awarded the project in 2009 and invested $1.4 billion to reclaim 2.69 sq km near Port of Colombo for a new city district called Port City, which aims to be a regional business and financial center with residences, offices, and resorts.
By August 2016, the project was re-approved after an environmental study, and China Harbor received additional land on a 99-year lease.
By fall 2018, master planning was complete and land reclamation was nearly finished.
Colombo Port City: Promotional Video
Discuss: Colombo Port City
Would you invest in this project? With what kind of time frame?
Was it a good deal for China Harbor?
What did China learn about Sri Lanka politics? What did they not understand?
Back into Chaos: 2018
Maithripala Sirisena (b. 1951), seventh president of Sri Lanka (2015-2019)
In 2018, President Sirisena unexpectedly fired PM Wickremesinghe and appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa as the new PM.
Wickremesinghe argued the President lacked the constitutional power to dismiss him.
A court stayed the appointment, and Rajapaksa lost a parliamentary vote.
The President and Rajapaksa refused to accept the vote, leading to a potential crisis.
Back into Chaos: 2019
Easter bombings on April 21, 2019, killed and wounded hundreds; investigations pointed to Islamist militants.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa (right) won the November 2019 presidential election; appointed his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa (former president) as prime minister.
Back into Chaos: 2020-2022
2020–2021: COVID‑19; SLPP won a large parliamentary majority in August 2020; subsequent constitutional changes strengthened the presidency
March–July 2022: Severe economic collapse, fuel/food shortages, mass protests
A New Era: 2024
Anura Kumara Dissanayake (b. 1968)
May 2022: Mahinda Rajapaksa resigned as PM
July 2022: President Gotabaya fled and Ranil Wickremesinghe became acting president.
Sep 23, 2024: Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the National People’s Power Party won presidential election and sworn in
What will happen to Hambantota?
Hambantota: Will it be a naval base?
The port’s structure – at least for now – has only one way in and out, making it unsuitable for military purposes.
While the port presents potential strategic values, does overt militarization benefit the Belt and Road initiative?
The world will be watching China’s actions: The port can also be seen as a strategy to gain global trust.
Hambantota: Other visions
Entrepot
Chinese companies are moving to Sri Lanka because of cheaper labor, lower environmental standards, etc.
Trade headwinds push companies to do final export processing there: SL’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), such as with the EU, allow for tariff hopping.
Ghost town?
Similar to China’s infrastructure projects at home: “if you build it, they will come”
This seems possible only if SL domestic politics prevent the kinds of investments it would take.
So far, Sri Lanka also wants it to succeed.
Discuss: Assessing the BRI
What are the risks and benefits of BRI?
Which parts of the Chinese state are in charge of BRI? How is the project conceived and implemented?
Is there a masterplan / blueprint? If so, what does it look like?
Will political centralization under Xi help or hurt BRI?
What about Xi?
Can we still argue that fragmentation persists under Xi? Can bureaucracies, local governments, and companies still have the flexibility to interpret and implement major programs announced by Xi? As long as it exists, the tri-block structure predicts fragmentation in China’s state system and BRI’s dynamic policy process.
How does the BRI in Sri Lanka corroborate, challenge, or qualify this argument?
Will political centralization under Xi help or hurt BRI?
BRI: Fragmented Motives and Policies
Chinese state as a tri-block structure: political leadership, national bureaucracy, and the government’s economic arms (i.e., state-owned companies and local governments)
Not a uniform plan but a process of multiple steps and stages, with fragmented motives and policies.
Despite the geopolitical rhetoric from Beijing, BRI has largely proceeded via commercial activities and should be viewed as capitalist behavior under China’s fragmented state.
Chinese SOEs, individually and collectively, have many business and political interests in a country, and can’t be assumed to be all doing Beijing’s geopolitical bidding.
BRI at 10: Complex Legacies
Rewards
China’s development finance institutions provided approximately half a trillion dollars from 2008-2021, with at least $331 billion during the BRI period (2013-2021).
China is leading a new model of South-South cooperation by providing financing and creating alternative, developing country-led institutions, increasing their agency in global governance.
Chinese finance heavily targets industrial and infrastructure projects; they complement, rather than displace, traditional development finance.
Risks
Developing countries face increased debt problems, with many owing significant amounts to China.
China’s overseas power plants and infrastructure projects release substantial carbon dioxide and cause pollution.
Chinese development projects risk damaging biodiversity and Indigenous lands more than World Bank projects.
Discuss: Lessons Learned
What can we learn from Sri Lanka project moving forward? Discuss:
BRI countries
China
the West
Lessons learned: China
China now wields significant financial power and influence over other countries; Developing nations are no longer solely dependent on the West for financing.
What are the means and consequences of this financing transition, especially when China’s lending and developmental projects are less transparent than those of international financial institutions?
Lessons learned: BRI Countries
Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Xi Jinping
A deal is not final; they can always renegotiate.
Democracy provides leverage: Need to make good election promises.
Political conflict helps extract better deals.
Lessons learned: the West
Is the US learning all the wrong things about the BRI?
End of USAID: A Gift to China?
Beyond BRI: Broader Questions
Why and how did economic interdependence generate economic coercion and political conflict, rather than cooperation and convergence on norms and behaviors?
Are we in a new era in which economic interdependence is replacing “organized globalization” managed by multilateral institutions and the rules they generate? If so, what are the consequences?